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BLINDINGLY OBVIOUS CHRISTIAN 
ANTI-SEMITISM 
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann 
In "Stump, Kretzmann, and Historical Blindness," Paul Griffiths charges us 
with "being historically blind and (therefore) ethically insensitive.'" "These 
are harsh words," he says, but he thinks that he is justified in applying them 
to us as the authors of "Theologically Unfashionable Philosophy,"2 our reply 
to Gordon Kaufman's "Evidentialism: A Theologian's Response" (p. 79).3 
Although Griffiths apparently agrees with us in rejecting much of Kaufman's 
position, he shares Kaufman's view that the "Christian faith ... bear[s] some 
significant responsibility for most of the evils" of the twentieth century (p. 
79). In particular, Griffiths accuses us of being historically blind to Christian 
anti-semitism and therefore ethically insensitive to it. Our position leaves us, 
in his words, "happily untroubled by (even unaware of?) what most Christians 
have believed about important matters such as the status of the Jewish people 
before God and the modes of behavior toward Jews justified by this supposed 
status" (p. 84). 
Griffiths rests his defense of Kaufman's view on "the following particu-
larization of [Kaufman's] more general claims: [H] Christian ideas about 
Jews have contributed directly and in significant measure to the occurrence 
of the holocaust" (p. 79). "[T]he truth of H," he says, "seems to me blindingly 
obvious" (p. 80). We think that all educated, fair-minded people must agree 
that H is indisputably true, but only on one interpretation of H. 
Luther's obscenely immoral "sincere advice" to Christians on what to "do 
with this rejected and condemned people, the Jews," quoted with rhetorical 
effect by Griffiths (p. 83), does, of course, count as an expression of Christian 
ideas in a sociological sense: it emanates from the great Reformer himself 
writing in a pastoral capacity. Just as plainly, it must count as an expression 
of anti-Christian ideas in a doctrinal sense: it is incompatible with such 
defining pronouncements as the Sermon on the Mount and the second (at 
least) of Christianity'S two Great Commandments. 
Taking ideas associated with some institution, such as a religion, a philoso-
phy, or a political system in a sociological sense is a matter of characterizing 
those ideas as they are understood by individual adherents of or participants 
in the institution who suppose the ideas to be part of the institution. Taking 
the ideas associated with that institution doctrinally is a matter of considering 
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the content of the ideas constitutive of the institution itself.4 Taking Marxist 
ideas sociologically, for instance, requires considering what individual Rus-
sian Marxists or Chinese Marxists hold as Marxist; taking Marxist ideas 
doctrinally involves investigating Marx's position itself. (The distinction does 
not require that there be one determinate source for the ideas or institution 
in question. Taking capitalist ideas sociologically, for example, requires con-
sidering what 19th-century British capitalists, for example, or American capi-
talists of the Cold War period held capitalism to consist in. Taking capitalism 
doctrinally involves reflecting on the defining characteristics of capitalism 
and what is compatible with them and presupposed or implied by them.) 
There will, of course, generally be some recognizable degree of similarity 
between the ideas of a particular institution taken in a doctrinal sense and the 
ideas taken in a sociological sense. Unless the adherents of a particular 
institution are hopelessly wrong in what they take the institution to be, there 
will be at least some overlap between the ideas associated with that institution 
taken sociologically and the ideas taken doctrinally. 
We can consider Luther's sort of anti-semitic ideas, too, either in a socio-
logical or a doctrinal sense. That is, we can consider what such anti-semitic 
ideas, considered in the abstract, imply, presuppose, warrant, and so on. 
Answers to those questions are relatively unproblematic. Or we can consider 
anti-semitic ideas in a sociological sense and ask how Luther and others 
understood them. What actions, for example, did they prompt in Luther or in 
others who held them? Reliable answers to those questions are at best difficult 
to come by, because of the notorious problems in getting reliable information 
about an individual's psychology or in drawing reliable inferences from a 
person's beliefs to a person's actions and vice versa. 
So to us, too, H seems obviously true if 'Christian ideas' is taken in a 
sociological sense to mean anti-semitic ideas held by people who supposed 
those ideas to be Christian and if the anti-semitic ideas at issue are, in turn, 
understood in a doctrinal rather than a sociological sense. But H seems to us 
obviously false if 'Christian ideas' is taken doctrinally to mean ideas entailed 
by or included in Christianity itself, and H strikes us as only dubiously true 
if we understand the anti-semitic ideas in question sociologically rather than 
doctrinally. 
Contrary to the suggestion in the title of Griffiths's article and his explicit 
claims in it, the issue between him and us is not over whether a religion's 
history is important or unimportant, but rather over the way in which a 
religion (or some other body of belief) is to be defined. In replying to Kauf-
man, we relied on the distinction between taking ideas doctrinally, on the one 
hand, and taking them sociologically, on the other. To begin with, we ob-
served (p. 329a) that as philosophers we are naturally concerned with the 
meaning of and evidence for and against doctrinal propositions, and that 
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theologians, as represented by Kaufman, are put off by this philosophical 
focus on theory in part because it seems to render philosophers of religion 
indifferent to the sociology of religion. But someone working in atomic 
physics, for example, might similarly seem indifferent to contemporary so-
ciological data (and therefore ethically insensitive) just because qua physicist 
she's focusing on the constitution of the nucleus rather than taking account 
of the dangers posed by nuclear power plants and the attendant political 
controversy about them. Analogously, entirely ignoring Luther's certifiable 
anti-semitism while trying to make sense of, say, the doctrine of the atone-
ment is methodologically sensible. It is no more evidence of historical (or 
political) blindness and consequent ethical insensitivity than is not attending 
to the debate over nuclear energy while investigating the strong force; and, 
of course, it is perfectly compatible with the philosopher's or the physicist's 
commitment to a robust program of social action. 
But we also used the sociologicaVdoctrinal distinction in directly address-
ing Kaufman's charges against Christianity, and it is this use of it that worries 
Griffiths. He says that our "strategy is to drive a wedge between Christianity 
and (some of) its adherents, and to suggest that while one may easily be able 
to show that some adherents of Christianity have held antisemitic views, one 
cannot show that there is anything about Christianity itself that suggests, 
requires, or makes plausible such views" (p. 80). Griffiths is right about our 
two-pronged strategy, but his description of the second prong is wrong. Of 
course, there are things about Christianity that have suggested anti-semitism 
or made it plausible to deplorably many people over two millennia. What we 
claimed one couldn't show is only that "Christianity itself ... requires ... such 
views." We stated our claim this way: "we are skeptical about the possibility 
of anyone's producing a sound argument" "that there is a single set of beliefs 
which counts as Christian," and "that this single system entails the rightness 
of moral precepts that enjoin or at least warrant ... genocide" (p. 333; empha-
sis added). Griffiths alters the second part of our claim into this less demand-
ing one: "one must then be able to show that there is something about 
Christianity so understood that entails antisemitism, or, more weakly, war-
rants it or makes it plausible" (p. 80; emphasis added). 
Once our claim has been altered in that way, Griffiths can readily say that 
"of course, it is very easy to show that there are indeed such common threads 
and connecting themes that do warrant antisemitism and make it plausible" 
(p. 81). If we take Griffiths's apparently broad construal of 'warrant' and the 
vagueness of 'common threads and connecting themes,' then we agree; it is 
very easy. We never were nor could have been skeptical about the possibility 
that a sociological survey of Christians would turn up appalling anti-semi-
tism, which some Christians have supposed was supported or even required 
by Christian doctrine. 
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The two particular considerations on which Griffiths actually rests his case 
are nonetheless worth examining, just because they are far closer to the core 
of Christian doctrine than are the unmistakably anti-semitic fulminations of 
Chrysostom or Luther he introduces later. 
The first of these two considerations is what Griffiths calls "the blood-guilt 
theory" (p. 81), stemming from Matthew 27:25: "Then answered all the 
people, and said, His blood be on us, and on our children." Of course an 
earnest Christian reading of this passage has often suggested anti-semitism. 
But it can't also have warranted it, in the epistemological or logical sense of 
'warrant.' There clearly isn't anything in the people's answer that "entails the 
rightness of moral precepts that enjoin or at least warrant" human vengeance 
against those Jews, their children and their children's children. There isn't 
even anything in the people's answer that entails blood-guilt. No plausible 
doctrine of prayer entails that every petition be granted; no plausible doctrine 
of God's judgment and mercy entails God's actually damning everyone who 
says "Well, I'll be damned." The kindest thing to be said about Christians 
who have based anti-semitism on Matthew 27:25 is that they've been crimi-
nally irrational in drawing doctrinal inferences. 
The second of the two considerations on which Griffiths rests his case is 
"the supersessionist theory": "the view that God's covenant with the Jewish 
people has been superseded, made null and without effect, by the life, death, 
and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth" (p. 81). Insofar as Judaism and Chris-
tianity include incompatible bodies of belief, adherence to one involves sup-
posing the other wrong. In our reply to Kaufman we argued at some length 
that nothing in the belief that Christianity is right implies so much as arro-
gance, let alone hostility, towards those who hold non-Christian beliefs. We 
won't repeat those arguments here, but we do want to say a word about 
Griffiths's claim that adherence to Christianity fundamentally includes the 
notion that Judaism has been rendered null and void. Nothing could be more 
fundamental to Christian doctrine than the Bible, which simply incorporates 
the Jewish Scriptures, and certainly not because they present the record of a 
canceled contract, a record over which the children of the new adoption might 
gloat. Griffiths brings out the intended force of the null-and-void clause in 
his version of supersessionist theory immediately after stating the theory: 
"from which the conclusion is drawn that the Jewish people since the time 
of Christ have no more reason for being" (p. 81; emphasis added). No doubt 
some people have sometimes drawn that conclusion; but, of course, it is as 
invalid as it is immoral, even if the null-and-void clause is retained. A theory 
compatible with the Bible and the creeds would hold that Christian doctrine 
supersedes Judaism not as the First Republic superseded the French monar-
chy, not even as Einstein's physics superseded Newton's, but more nearly as 
algebra supersedes arithmetic-incorporating much of it, essentially depend-
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ing on it, and enhancing its range and power. Christians who draw the con-
clusion that the Jews have no more reason for being are being quite as 
irrational as but far more reprehensible than (imaginary) algebraists who 
would wipe out arithmeticians. 
Fundamental to Griffiths's entire criticism of our position is his rejection 
of any "ahistorical and essentialist reading of the referent of the term 'Chris-
tianity'" (p. 83), the sort of thing he suspects lies at the root of the ethical 
insensitivity he charges us with. We don't accept his yoking of essentialist 
with ahistorical approaches to religion, but in any event his own approach to 
understanding 'Christianity' is not so much historical as sociological. He 
wants to define Christianity in terms of beliefs or practices common to its 
adherents in various periods and places. On his account, "Christian ideas" 
isn't ambiguous; it can be understood only sociologically. And, of course, it 
is his sociological approach that enables him, as he supposes, to discern in 
Christianity the evils for which he and Kaufman both hold Christianity re-
sponsible. But it is important to recognize that this approach, if workable, 
would enable us to show that every body of belief espoused by a group of 
people over a period of time is similarly responsible for the evils committed 
in its name by the members of that group. Marxism is thus responsible for 
the horrors of the gulag; Islam is responsible for the unrelenting efforts to 
exterminate the Kurds. On Griffiths's approach, no culturally significant body 
of belief will be above serious moral reproach since, as far as we know, there 
is no culturally significant body of belief whose adherents have not perpe-
trated some evil in its name. On Griffiths's approach, any adherent of such a 
body of belief who wanted to associate the evils in question with people rather 
than doctrines would similarly be guilty of historical blindness and ethical 
insensitivity. 
Furthermore, it isn't clear that Griffiths's approach is workable. If you 
follow Griffiths and characterize religion purely sociologically, so that it 
becomes not a body of doctrine, which can be distinguished from the various 
beliefs various of its adherents take it to include, but instead characterize 
religions just as vague sets of beliefs and practices common to vaguely 
delineated groups of people, how do you determine which of the many sets 
of beliefs widely held by Europeans in the first half of the twentieth century 
is in fact responsible for the Holocaust? The people who carried out or 
tolerated the Holocaust shared not only anti-semitic beliefs and Christian 
beliefs, but also lots of others: economic beliefs in the merits of capitalism, 
social beliefs in the expertise of scientists and the deference due them, po-
litical and quasi-historical beliefs in the cultural superiority of a select group 
of Europeans. If you adopt the approach Griffiths advocates, then in asking 
what Christianity is responsible for (or what anti-semitic beliefs are respon-
sible for), you are asking not about what is entailed by a certain body of 
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doctrine but only about the connection between particular beliefs of a par-
ticular group of people and particular actions those people performed or 
permitted others to perform. On what basis could you decide that it is pre-
cisely the religious beliefs or the anti-semitic beliefs of these people, as 
distinct from their economic ones (or combinations of them all) which are 
responsible for the Holocaust? Surely not simply on the basis of what the 
gUilty might have said, since, as everyone recognizes, people in such circum-
stances are strongly inclined to gloss their self-regarding actions with a patina 
of what strikes them as ideologically more palatable. We might suppose that 
anti-semitic ideas had to have pushed their adherents at least in the direction 
of genocide even if their ultimate or strongest motive was something else. 
But though this sounds plausible, whether or not it's right-given the vagaries 
of human psychology-is a matter for sociological research; and what re-
search there is doesn't clearly support it. For example, in her sociological 
study of Poles who risked their lives to rescue Jews during the Nazi period, 
Nechama Tee devotes one entire chapter to "anti-semitic helpers," that is, to 
overt anti-semites who nonetheless risked their lives to rescue Jews.s Al-
though Tee titles this chapter "The Rare Case of the Anti-Semitic Helper," 
she also says "only a few helpers [Poles of any description who rescued Jews 
at cost to themselves] managed to steer clear of the influences of the diffuse 
cultural anti-semitism. Most were caught in its clutches .... "6 Finally, it is not 
clear what the relevance is of quoting historical figures such as Chrysostom 
in this context, given Griffiths's approach to Christian ideas, since few of 
those involved in the evils of the Holocaust would have read Chrysostom or 
been influenced by him. 
So characterizing a body of beliefs sociologically rather than doctrinally 
makes it at least much harder to tell whether those beliefs are responsible for 
some particular evil. We find H blindingly obvious on one interpretation just 
because we make the distinction Griffiths rejects, between doctrinal and 
sociological readings of bodies of belief. We take not only Christian beliefs 
but also anti-semitic beliefs doctrinally; and it does seem to us obviously true 
that anti-Christian anti-semitic beliefs taken doctrinally have a readily dis-
cernible connection to morally reprehensible actions against Jews. Without 
the distinction between doctrinal and sociological readings of bodies of be-
lief, however, the blindingly obvious truth of H seems to us much harder to 
discern. In order to be struck by the blindingly obvious truth of H one must 
see the distinction Griffiths rejects. 
Consequently, if religion is defined only sociologically as Griffiths thinks 
it should be, it is difficult to determine whether a religion, or any body of 
belief, has been responsible for some particular evil; and in that case Griffiths 
can't support his claim that Christianity was responsible for the Holocaust. 
But if such determinations can in fact be made, then it looks as if every 
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world view or body of belief of any cultural significance is responsible for 
serious evil. There will be no religion, no worldview, which is not similarly 
impugned, and Griffiths's approach will tell us only about the proclivities of 
groups of people, not about the moral merits and demerits of bodies of belief. 
For all our deep differences with Griffiths, we are so far in agreement with 
him that we, too, think anti-semitism a monstrous moral evil. And we, too, 
think that in every age some Christians have believed that Christianity en-
tailed, enjoined, or was at least compatible with anti-semitism. If we also 
thought that (per impossibile) Christianity itself really did entail, enjoin, or 
permit anti-semitism, we would take our stand not with Christianity but 
against it. 7 
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